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1976] SECURITIES REGULATION
Securities Regulation-Supreme Court Acceptance of the
Birnbaum Rule
Although other sections of the Securities Act of 1933' and the
Securities Exchange Act of 19342 provide expressly for private civil
actions," the civil actions implied under section 10(b) of the 1934 Acte
have long been favorites of plaintiffs in federal courts." In 1952, how-
ever, a limitation was placed on plaintiffs' access to section 10(b)
actions. In that year the Second Circuit, in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp.,' ruled that a plaintiff who alleged injury suffered "in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities" under section 10(b) and SEC
rule 10b-5 *7 could not maintain an action if he himself had not bought
or sold the securities involved. In subsequent years the Birnbaum doc-
trine was variously adopted,8 restricted, 9 and rejected' by lower federal
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et. seq. (1971).
2. Id. § 78a et. seq.
3. See note 43 infra.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1971) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
5. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13-14 n.10(1971); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
In recent years, rule 10b-5 has become a significant weapon against corporate
mismanagement. See Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule lOb-5 Corporate
Mismanagement Cases, 86 HAv. L. RPv. 1007 (1973); Note, Limiting the Plaintiff
Class: Rule l0b-5 and the Federal Securities Code, 72 Mic. L. REv. 1398 (1974). The
trend in federal courts has been toward expansion of civil liability under rule lOb-5. See,
e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970); N. LArrN, R. JENNNGS, & R.
BuxBAum, CORPORATIONS iii (4th ed. 1968).
6. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
8. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974); Landy v.
FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Mount Clemens
Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455
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courts. It was not until twenty-three years after its original pronounce-
ment that the United States Supreme Court ruled on the doctrine
directly. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores'1 a divided Court
approved Birnbaum, holding that only purchasers and sellers of securi-
ties have the privilege'" of bringing suit for money damages under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5. In consecrating this obstacle, the Court left
plaintiffs to pursue state rather than federal remedies for violation of
section 10(b) of the Act.
Blue Chip Stamps arose out of an offering of securities that defend-
ant Blue Chip Stamps, a trading-stamp firm, was required to make
pursuant to a federal antitrust consent decree.13 Retailers like plaintiff
who had used the stamp service of Blue Chip's predecessor'4 were
entitled to purchase quantities of securitiesr in Blue Chip proportional
to their past stamp usage. Plaintiff Manor Drug Stores, which was not a
party to the consent decree, brought suit under section 10(b). The
complaint alleged that defendants intentionally made their prospectus
overly pessimistic, so that plaintiff and others'0 would reject the offer,
thereby enabling defendants to sell the securities to the public later at a
far higher price. Plaintiff alleged that its reliance on misleading state-
ments in the prospectus caused its failure to accept the offer within the
period of its duration.17
The district court dismissed the action because plaintiff failed to
meet the requirements of Birnbaum: it had neither bought nor sold
securities.'1 While purportedly adhering to Birnbaum the Ninth Circuit
reversed, finding that the consent decree satisfied the reasons for the
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971); Jensen v. Voyles, 393 F.2d 131
(10th Cir. 1968).
9. See text accompanying notes 29-32 infra.
10. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
11. 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
12. The question is not one of constitutional standing, but of statutory interpreta-
tion. See Note, Securities Law-Rule lOb-5-They Had So Many Plaintiffs They Didn't
Know What To Do, 53 N.C.L. Rv. 150, 155-57 (1974).
13. 95 S. Ct. at 1920-21.
14. Blue Chip Stamp Company was the name of the predecessor firm. It was
merged into Blue Chip Stamps pursuant to the consent decree, and was also a defendant,
along with eight of its nine controlling shareholders. Id.
15. The offering was required to be made in units consisting of debentures and
shares of common stock. Id. at 1921.
16. Plaintiff claimed to represent the class of offerees who rejected defendants'
offer. Id.
17. Id.
18. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35, 40 (C.D. Cal.
1971), rev'd, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
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Birnbaum rule:19 the court reasoned that the consent decree limited the
potential liability of defendants, provided a precise measure of damages,
and even offered an "objective basis" for establishing that plaintiff's
intention to buy was thwarted by defendants' misrepresentation.
In reversing the Ninth Circuit and approving the Birnbaum doc-
trine, the Supreme Court split evenly three ways. While three justices
found that section 10(b) did not require a plaintiff to be a purchaser or
seller of securities, 0 three others found such a requirement in the
statute;21 their remaining colleagues, in the opinion of the Court by
Justice Rehnquist, found the statute inconclusive.22 The Court's opinion
concluded, for reasons of policy, that plaintiff's failure to sell or buy
securities should bar it from federal court.
Before examining the Blue Chip Stamps decision, it is helpful to
consider briefly the genesis and evolution of the seller-purchaser require-
ment first iterated in Birnbaum23 for rule lOb-5 actions. In Birnbaum
the Second Circuit based its dismissal of plaintiff's action on an interpre-
tation of rule 10b-5, holding that "Rule X-10B-5 extended protection
only to the defrauded purchaser or seller," and that section 10(b) was
directed at the kind of fraud "usually associated with the sale or pur-
chase of securities" rather than at corporate mismanagement. 24
The Birnbaum doctrine suffered serious erosion before its affirma-
tion by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps. One of the reasons for
this erosion was the Supreme Court's 1963 mandate that section 10(b)
be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate
19. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd,
95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
20. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan. dissented. 95 S. Ct.
at 1937.
21. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion, in which he was joined by Justices
Stewart and Marshall. Id. at 1935.
22. He was joined by Justice White and Chief Justice Burger.
23. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952). When the controlling shareholder of the corporation in which plaintiffs
owned stock sold control to a third party, the value of plaintiffs' stock fell. The court
found that, since plaintiffs had neither bought nor sold shares, rule 10b-5 did not apply.
Judge Augustus Hand, writing for himself, Judge Learned Hand, and Chief Judge
Thomas Swan, cited the press release with which the SEC had explained its adoption of
rule 10b-5: the rule was intended to close a loophole in the Commission's anti-fraud
powers by "prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in
fraud in their purchase." Id. at 463. The unanimous panel concluded that the rule should
apply no further. Later decisions upholding Birnbaum were based at least in part on
construction of section 10(b), however. See, e.g., A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d
393 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 252 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
24. 193 F.2d at 464.
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its remedial purposes."2 5 By 1968, the continuing vitality of Birnbaum
was doubted by a leading district court judge,26 discounted by commen-
tators,27 and apparently left open by the court that had created it.28 It
became generally accepted that plaintiffs who had neither purchased nor
sold securities could sue under rule lOb-5 in four categories of cases.
First, shareholders in a corporation which sold or purchased in a
fraudulent transaction were allowed to bring derivative actions. 20 Sec-
ondly, "forced sellers," that is, persons who had not sold securities, but
who would be obliged to do so eventually, either practically or by oper-
ation of law, could maintain lOb-5 actions.80 Thirdly, "aborted pur-
chaser-sellers," plaintiffs who failed to purchase or sell because their
agreements to do so had been breached, withstood Birnbaum-based
motions to dismiss."' Lastly, plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief to pre-
vent the sale of securities did not need to show that they were purchasers
or sellers.3 2
The most serious attacks on the Birnbaum requirement occurred in
1973. In Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.38 the Seventh
25. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
26. Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Bonsal, J.).
27. See, e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for
Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L Rlnv. 268 (1968); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Rule: An
Archaic Tool for Determining Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 56 GEO. LJ. 1177 (1968).
28. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
970 (1967). The Second Circuit later dispelled the confusion by stating that Birnbaum
was "still the rule" at least in actions for damages. Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581
(2d Cir. 1968).
29. See, e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Ruckle v.
Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
30. See, e.g., Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Co., 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971) (plaintiff's stock was converted into a speculative right
to payment of money); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1970)
(liquidation of corporation would cause minority shareholder to sell "as a practical
matter"); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (plaintiff would be forced to sell shares or be faced with an
antitrust divestiture decree at a later time); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (plaintiff would have to sell because statute
provided for short-form merger when some other shareholders acquired a certain
percentage of outstanding stock).
31. See, e.g., A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Opper v.
Hancock Sec. Corp., 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F.
Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967). This situation does not constitute a true exception, because it
is covered by the language of the statute. Section 3(a) (13) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a) (13) (1971) provides: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract
to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." Section 3(a) (14) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a) (14) (1971) provides: 'The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to
sell or otherwise dispose of."
32. See, e.g., Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
950 (1970); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
33. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). When Bank
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Circuit expressly disavowed Birnbaum, saying that the purchaser-seller
limitation was "not part of the law of this Circuit."' 4  The court pro-
posed to permit suit by any "investor" in a securities "transaction," since
investors were the class of persons that Congress intended section 10
(b) to protect.3 5
The circuit court opinion in Blue Chip Stamps also represented a
serious erosion of Birnbaum.36 The Ninth Circuit allowed plaintiffs
action despite its failure to buy or sell securities. Two members of a
three-judge panel, while maintaining their allegiance to the Birnbaum
rule, found that it did not bar plaintiff. The majority found that the
Birnbaum rule had its justification in the prevention of unlimited liabili-
ty of defendants and in its denial of the judicial forum to plaintiffs who
could establish neither that defendants' actions had damaged them, nor
to what degree they had been damaged.3 7 The Ninth Circuit saw no
such problems in the Blue Chip offer. Since the consent decree offer was
made to a limited class of persons, the potential liability of defendants
was limited. Because the amount of securities that plaintiff could have
bought was prescribed by the decree, damages could easily be deter-
mined. The majority found that plaintiffs complaint even solved the
problem of proving that it was defendants' misrepresentation that caused
the damage: the difference between 101 dollars, the price at which
defendants had been obliged to sell blocks of securities, and 315 dol-
lars, their later market value, was so great that it provided "prima facie,
an objective basis for a factual inference that users properly informed
rather than misled would have accepted the offer."3
The Supreme Court was unpersuaded by the Ninth Circuit's analy-
sis. The first issue it determined was whether the language of section
10(b) controlled. 9 Both the prevailing and the concurring opinions
Service Corporation (BSC) traded 7000 shares of stock for a car l.asing business,
plaintiff shareholders of BSC, as part of the deal, personally guaranteed payment of
BSC's liabilities to defendant. When defendant brought suit in state court on the
guarantees, plaintiffs sued in federal district court for their rescission.
34. Id. at 661.
35. See note 4 supra.
36. 492 F.2d 136.
37. Id. at 141.
38. Id. at 142.
39. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, leaned heavily on the legislative
history of the 1934 Act in construing section 10(b). He pointed out that Congress
rejected language that would have defined "sale" and "purchase" to include attempts,
offers, and solicitations. 95 S. Ct. at 1932 n.13. Both his and the concurring opinions
emphasized the refusals of later Congresses to amend section 10(b) to include "'any
attempt to purchase or sell' any security." Id. at 1924, 1935. Justice Rehnquist cited
Congress' obvious fear that strike suits would result from the private causes of action
19761
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contrasted section 10(b)'s "in connection with the purchase or sale'
with broader language in section 17(a) of the 1933 Act4" that reaches
fraud "in the offer or sale" of securities. The concurring opinion found
that this contrasting language "indicate[d] clearly that Congress selec-
tively and carefully distinguished between offers, purchases, and
sales,"4 whereas the opinion of the Court found that this difference,
along with others, "though not conclusive, support[ed] the result
reached by the Birnbaum court. '42
This argument is not so persuasive as it may appear. Using the
reasoning of the Blue Chip Stamps concurrers, the Court should not
have implied private causes of action under the 1934 Act. Its approval
of such actions-including those under section 10(b)---came in the face
of Congress' express creation of private rights of action in other sections
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.43 In implying those actions, the Court
ignored the express actions, basing its decision on the policy ground that
"private enforcement. . . provides a necessary supplement to Commis-
sion action. 44
In dissent, Justice Blackmun relied on the statutory language to
support the plaintiffs action. He argued that Blue Chip Stamps came
within section 10(b) since the word "sale" could properly be construed
to mean "not only a single, individualized act transferring property from
one party to another, but also the generalized event of public disposal of
property through advertisement, auction, or some other market mecha-
nism."4
There being no definition of "contract" in the 1934 Act, a bet-
ter approach would have been to construe the statutory provision
"any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of' as equivalent to a "sale.""
As the Ninth Circuit majority pointed out, a decision by Manor to
purchase "could not have been thwarted by the intervention of an earlier
that it created expressly, and reasoned that courts should move especially carefully to
avoid that danger in administering judicially implied remedies. Id. at 1928.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1971).
41. 95 S. Ct. at 1935.
42. Id. at 1924.
43. See, e.g., 1933 Act, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1971); id. § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771
(1971); 1934 Act, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1971).
44. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (allowing an implied private
cause of action under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1971)).
When the Court finally authorized a private cause of action under section 10(b), it did
so in a footnote, with, by its own admission, "virtually no discussion." 95 S. Ct. at 1923.
The decision came in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,
13 n.9 (1971).
45. 95 S. Ct. at 1939.
46. See note 31 supra.
260 [Vol. 54
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or higher bidder . ,47 In effect, what Manor had under the consent
decree was more than an offer: it was an option contract, albeit unen-
forceable because unsupported by consideration. Interpreting "con-
tract" in the 1934 Act to include this kind of obligation would have led
to the result that Justice Blackmun urged.48 Although, as the Court
observed, a consent decree is not enforceable by those who are not
parties to it,49 allowing plaintiff in Blue Chip Stamps recovery under this
theory would not be foreclosed. Plaintiffs action was not to enforce the
consent decree, but to recover for fraud.50
The three remaining members of the Court, having found no
statutory answer to the question of the necessity of the purchaser-seller
requirement, turned their attention to policy considerations. Their first
concern was avoidance of "liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." 51 The Court seemed to
view the alternatives as either retaining Bimnbaum or discarding all
"standing" requirements under rule lOb-5. The Court warned that, with
the Birnbaum barrier removed, "strike suits" under rule lOb-5 would be
not only much more frequent, but also peculiarly vexatious. Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that vexatiousness would result because oral testi-
mony would be the key to each additionally allowed case, thus making
summary judgment unavailable.52 In addition, the availability of exten-
47. 492 F.2d at 142 n.15.
48. The majority in the Ninth Circuit alluded to such an interpretation by saying
that a consent decree serves the "same function" as a contract. Id. at 142. Judge
Hufstedler, dissenting in the Ninth Circuit, clearly failed to recognize such an interpreta-
tion. She saw no reason to allow a cause of action to one of ten offerees who were of-
fered 10,000 each of a 100,000 share offering, while denying a cause of action to one of
eleven offerees of 10,000 shares of the same-sized offering. Id. at 147 n.10. But the Blue
Chip situation involved more than just a limited offering: it involved an obligation, al-
beit unenforceable by the offeree, to sell a given amount to a given person at a given
price.
49. Buckeye Coal & Ry. Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry., 269 U.S. 42, 49 (1925).
50. See 492 F.2d at 142 n.14. This situation is quite similar to the one in which A
has an unenforceable contract with B, and C fraudulently induces B not to perform. If B
would have performed, A can sue C for fraud at common law. Rice v. Manley, 66 N.Y.
82 (1876) (Plaintiffs contracted orally to buy cheese from Stebbins. Although the con-
tract was unenforceable by the statute of frauds, both plaintiffs and Stebbins would have
performed. Defendant, knowing of the contract, signed plaintiffs' names to a telegram to
Stebbins cancelling the order, then proceeded to buy the cheese himself. Allowing
plaintiffs to recover, the court said, "What difference can it make that plaintiffs could
not enforce their agreement against Stebbins?" Id. at 84.); Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829). See generally 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 41d (1943). In Blue Chip Stamps,
Blue Chip occupies in some way the positions of both B and C in the example. Like B,
Blue Chip would have performed had Manor Drug sought performance. Like C, Blue
Chip caused the deal not to go through. Blue Chip's actions, if fraudulent, should subject
it to liability.
51. 95 S. Ct. at 1931, quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174
N.E. 441, 444 (1931) (Cardozo, C.J.).
52. 95 S. Ct. at 1927. The oral testimony would presumably concern whether
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sive and expensive discovery under the federal rules would help make
the settlement value of "strike suits" high. Not only would this litigation
force corporations to abandon some normal activities in order to defend
against litigation, it would also damage the securities markets, and, the
Court implied, it would wreak havoc upon the federal trial apparatus.a
In reaching this pessimistic conclusion, Justice Rehnquist failed to
analyze the intermediate solution proposed by the Ninth Circuit." Had
he done so, he would have found his policy arguments refuted. The
Ninth Circuit's decision would have limited the potential liability of
defendants and the problems of proof that the majority identified. The
appellate court would have limited suit to cases in which plaintiff alleged
a relation sufficiently analogous to a contract to limit the number of
suits and to provide prima facie proof of causation.55
Furthermore, the Court's claim that rejection of Birnbaum would
provoke a flood of trials in federal courts is highly speculative. Adoption
of an intermediate solution, such as that of the Ninth Circuit, might well
cause a substantial increase in the number of 10b-5 complaints filed.
Without a definitive Supreme Court standard, plaintiffs would seek to
expand yet further the class of persons allowed to sue. But the case-by-
case erosion, were it to continue, would cause additional court burdens
plaintiff's loss was caused by his reliance on defendant's misrepresentation.
53. Id. at 1928.
54. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
55. See text accompanying note 38 supra. The Seventh Circuit's formulation, like
the Ninth Circuit's, answered the Supreme Court's policy objections. The Seventh Circuit
proposed to allow a cause of action only to investors in securities transactions. Attempts
further to erode Birnbaum would no doubt have continued under its approval, but
substantial numbers of additional trials would not necessarily have occurred. The Eason
rule would have barred plaintiff in Blue Chip Stamps. The decision in Eason dealt
expressly with this problem:
The volume of lOb-5 litigation has already expanded and will no doubt con-
tinue to do so whether or not the purchaser-seller limitation is rejected. The
extent to which a refusal to adhere to Birnbaum will affect that volume is
really a matter of speculation. The fact that the purchaser-seller limitation is
unacceptable does not mean that there will be no limit of any kind of the avail-
ability of private relief. For in each case the plaintiff will have to demonstrate
membership in the "special class" protected by Rule lOb-5 and injury as a di-
rect consequence of the alleged violation. The number of parties who may in-
voke Rule lOb-5 without the purchaser-seller limitation may not differ mater-
ially from the number who would recover by persuading a court to interpret
the purchaser-seller concept flexibly.
Assuming, however, that a complete abandonment of Birnbaum will signif-
icantly increase our workload, we may not for that reason reject what we be-
lieve to be a correct interpretation of the statute or the rule. Indeed, the vol-
ume of future litigation that was more clearly predictable as a consequence of
the Supreme Court's holding in [Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)] was not even mentioned in the Court's opinion as
a possible objection to its broadened interpretation of Rule lob-5 as encompas-
sing the misuse of proceeds of sale.
490 F.2d at 660-61 (footnotes omitted).
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at the pleading stage rather than the trial stage. For instance, many
plaintiffs would be unable to allege a causal link so strong as that shown
by Manor Drug Stores and would be dismissed pursuant to pre-trial
motions. Undoubtedly, upon dismissal, plaintiffs might often appeal,
thus creating additional appellate work. But the specter -of costly and
lengthy trials and discovery is a faint one indeed.
Had the Court wished truly to determine the validity of its "practi-
cal considerations," it could have let the Ninth Circuit's decision in Blue
Chip Stamps and the Seventh Circuit's total rejection of Birnbaum in
Eason stand for longer than twenty months.56 The Court had already
waited twenty-three years before ruling on the purchaser-seller limita-
tion. An influx in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits of 10b-5 suits that
failed to allege that plaintiff had purchased or sold securities would have
given the opinion an empirical rather than a speculative basis. 57
Despite questionable analysis in both the Court's opinion and the
concurring opinion, Blue Chip Stamps was correctly decided. In effect,
the Court's decision is that the common law rather than the federal
securities law will govern cases in which defendant induces plaintiff not
to purchase or sell securities. Both the prevailing and the concurring
opinions point out the availability of a state remedy for a fraudulent
scheme to induce plaintiff to fail to act.5 8  Indeed, Justice Rehnquist
specifically noted that Manor Drug Store's fraud action was pending
in a California court. 9
A major difference between the federal securities law and the state
fraud remedy is the element of intent that is required under each. In
common-law fraud cases in which plaintiff succeeds in establishing
defendant's liability for causing him to fail to act, intent by defendant to
deceive plaintiff is uniformly present.69 The cases do not dwell on that
element; however, they do not suggest the possibility of relief when
defendant's culpability is less. On the other hand, in federal lOb-5
56. The Seventh Circuit decided Eason on December 28, 1973, and the Ninth
Circuit decided Blue Chip Stamps on October 15, 1973; the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Blue Chip Stamps on June 9, 1975.
57. Of course, the number of suits threatened is one consideration of the Court for
which data would be unobtainable.
58. 95 S. Ct. at 1927 n.9, 1937.
59. Id. at 1927 n.9.
60. See, e.g., Butler v. Watkins, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 456 (1871); Fottler v. Moseley,
179 Mass. 295, 60 N.E. 788 (1901); Rice v. Manley, 66 N.Y. 82 (1876); Kaufmann v.
Delafield, 224 App. Div. 29, 229 N.Y.S. 545 (1928) (defendant held liable for inducing
plaintiff to retain stock, although plaintiff had not decided to sell); Snow v. Judson, 38
Barb. 210 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1862). See generally 37 AM. JuR. 2d Fraud and Deceit §§ 225,
242 (1968).
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actions, plaintiff may prevail with a showing of less than intent to
deceive. In these cases, plaintiff must ordinarily show "scienter" on
defendant's part.6' The degree of knowledge that defendant must have
had is the subject of dispute. No circuit, however, requires so much as a
showing of intent to deceive. 2
In the typical securities purchase or sale fraud situation, defendant
profits in some way from the misrepresentation that damages plaintiff.
When defendant is a broker who arranges plaintiff's purchase or sale, he
profits by receiving a commission. When there is privity between de-
fendant and plaintiff, a bad deal for plaintiff is ipso facto a good deal
for defendant. Even when there is no privity between the parties,
defendant is ordinarily selling to, purchasing from, or arranging transac-
tions with other persons, and profiting thereby. Indeed, given the poten-
tial liability under federal law for statements that induce purchases or
sales, people would rarely make statements that tended to induce others
to buy or sell without the possibility of profiting in some way. Thus,
when a plaintiff purchases or sells securities, a defendant who intention-
ally caused him to do so ordinarily had a motive to misrepresent. By
requiring a low degree of scienter, the federal securities law catches
some defendants in whom intent to deceive is present, but impossible of
proof. Indeed, a possible profit was present in Blue Chip Stamps, where
defendants owed plaintiff an unenforceable duty to sell securities below
value. Ordinarily, persons do not profit when others refrain from pur-
chasing or selling securities. Thus, there is ordinarily no motive for
intentional deception when there is no purchase or sale.
In the Blue Chip Stamps situation the state remedy should work
greater substantial justice than would a federal lob-5 remedy: by paint-
ing with a less broad brush, the state law can effectively discriminate
between defendants who intended to deceive and those who did not.08
61. Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5: Development of a New Standard, 23 CLEVE. ST.
L. REv. 493 (1974). See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
62. Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 598-600 (1972). For
example, the Second Circuit allows recovery on the basis of "reckless disregard for the
truth." Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971). The
Ninth Circuit rejects scienter as a separate element of a 10b-5 action. White v. Abrams,
495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). However, it allows recovery on the basis of mere
negligence, Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), as does the Eighth Circuit.
City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970). The Seventh Circuit
requires less than "bad faith intent to mislead." Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637
(7th Cir. 1963).
63. This difficulty in the federal remedy would be reduced by a sliding-scale
approach to the problem of scienter, as advocated in White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724
(9th Cir. 1974).
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Because of Blue Chip Stamps, defendants who had no reason to intend
deception but who have induced inaction will not be subjected to the
lower federal standard of scienter. Plaintiffs will prevail only against
defendants who actually intended to deceive them, and they will do so
in state courts. On the other hand, defendants who induced a purchase
or sale of securities ordinarily had a pecuniary reason to do so. Such
defendants may have intended deception but their intent may be im-
possible to prove. In those cases the federal scienter standard is appro-
priate. In cases in which defendants caused plaintiffs not to act, exten-
sion of a federal remedy would be inappropriate. The Supreme Court's
decision not to extend such a remedy not only reduces the burden on
the federal courts,64 it also works substantial justice.
HENRY PATRICK OGLESBY
64. The decision in Blue Chip Stamps puts a halt to further expansion of the class
of persons who may sue under rule 10b-5. However, the Supreme Court does not
significantly reduce the size to which that class had grown prior to Eason. The four
categories by which Birnbaum was eroded remain capable of federal suit. See text
accompanying notes 29-32 supra. A shareholder's right to sue derivatively following his
corporation's purchase or sale of securities will continue, as he sues on behalf of a
purchaser or seller. Although no support can be found in Blue Chip Stamps for
continuing to allow "forced sellers" a cause of action, this area presents only a minor
problem. By fulfilling a mere "needless formality," a requirement that they sell their
shares, the forced sellers will comply with the Birnbaum rule. Persons in the class of
"aborted purchaser-sellers" will clearly be able to sue under 10b-5: their contracts bring
them into the operation of the rule. While it does not refer specifically to injunctive
relief, the majority limits its holding to actions for damages.
There is thus ample evidence that Congress did not intend to extend a pri-
vate cause of action for money damages to the non-purchasing offeree of a
stock offering . . . for loss of the opportunity to purchase due to an overly
pessimistic prospectus. . ..
. WFe do not believe that. . . a shifting and highly fact-oriented dispo-
sition of the issue of who may bring a damage claim for violation of Rule
lob-5 is a satisfactory basis for a rule of liability imposed on the conduct of
business transactions.
95 S. Ct. at 1934 (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, "[ilt is not necessary in a suit for
equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for mone-
tary damages." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). In a
suit for injunctive relief, the Court's policy concern about strike suits with high settle-
ment values would be irrelevant. Therefore, plaintiffs seeking to prevent an unlawful sale
will be able to sue without purchaser or seller status.
Although Blue Chip Stamps did not involve corporate mismanagement, its primary
significance will be in effectively precluding any further movement in the direction of
affording federal relief for corporate mismanagement. Plaintiffs need expect no further
erosion in the Birnbaum doctrine as to rule lOb-5, and no other federal remedy provides
an effective basis for relief for corporate mismanagement. See note 5 supra.
